Do individuals who join the political opposition pay an economic price? We study this question using unique information on individual political activity from Hugo Chávez's Venezuela, the Maisanta database. The names of millions of pro-opposition supporters who signed recall petitions (seeking to remove Chávez from office) during [2002][2003], and the names of progovernment supporters who signed counter-petitions, were made public. Media accounts detail how this information has been utilized by both sides: by the Government to punish opposition supporters and firms, and by the overwhelmingly pro-opposition private sector to discriminate against government supporters in hiring. After linking this political database to both national household survey and manufacturing firm data, we find that pro-opposition individuals experience significant drops in total earnings after 2003. There is extensive churning in the labor market: pro-opposition individuals disproportionately leave public sector employment and progovernment individuals leave private sector employment. Pro-opposition firms have falling total employment, less access to foreign exchange, and rising tax burdens (possibly due to selective audits). The misallocation of resources associated with political polarization between 1999-2004 contributed to a decline of 5% in TFP in our sample. To the extent other regimes can identify and punish the political opposition, these findings may help explain why dislodging authoritarian regimes often proves difficult in less developed countries.
Introduction
How does political polarization affect individuals and societies? What cost are people willing to pay to express their political opinions, and how are these costs manipulated by rulers to hold on to power? What are the aggregate allocative efficiency impacts of living in a polarized society?
These questions have sparked a large political economy literature ranging from theoretical studies of conflict and appropriation to empirical analyses of the links between political conflict and economic growth. 2 We take a new look at these issues using unique data on the expression of individual political preferences in Hugo Chávez's Venezuela. We study how individuals' political affiliation affects labor market success and firm performance, and draw implications for aggregate total factor productivity (TFP). 3 We exploit information on individuals' decision of whether or not to sign a petition demanding the recall of President Chavez, or the counterpetitions to recall opposition leaders, for nearly all 12 million registered voters in Venezuelans.
This data on actual revealed preference behaviors, rather than stated survey opinions, is a major strength, as is the coverage of an entire population rather than just political or business elites.
This database, called Maisanta, was made publicly available during Venezuela's recall petition 1 "El que firme contra Chávez está firmando contra la patria," El Universal, October 17, 2003 . See also Ciudadanía Activa (2006), 0m48s. 2 For some examples, see Hirshleifer (1991) Skaperdas (1992) , Alesina and Rodrik (1994) , Kuran (1995), and Benabou (2004) . Cross-country studies of growth and political conflict include Londregan and Poole (1990) , Easterly et al. (1993), and Alesina et al. (1996) . 3 Our approach is related to Fisman's (2001) study of how crony links to Suharto in Indonesia boosted stock market valuations, and Khwaja and Mian's (2006) analysis of Pakistani politicians' credit access. It also relates to the large literature on patronage in less developed countries (Cox and McCubbins 1986 , Barkan and Chege 1989 , Case 2001 , and on the returns to communist party membership in China (Li et al 2007, Morduch and Sicular 2000) .
battles of [2002] [2003] [2004] . 4 We match individuals in this unusual dataset to nationally representative household and manufacturing panel surveys, to estimate how individuals' political affiliations affect individual labor market and firm outcomes during Chavez's turbulent rule.
We find strong evidence of labor market "churning" across public and private sector employment during and after the recall battle, with opposition supporters significantly more likely to sort into private sector firms (whose owners are overwhelmingly pro-opposition themselves) and government supporters into the public sector. Multiple channels are likely to be driving these patterns, including systematic hiring discrimination by employers against people with different political views (which has been extensively reported within the Venezuelan media), as well as voluntary sorting by individuals into work environments where their own political views are in the majority. Regardless of the exact cause, these shifts are likely to have negative welfare consequences due to the loss of firm-specific human capital as well as worker job search and moving costs.
In a second labor market finding, opposition supporters experience moderate drops in their overall labor earnings during the post-2003 period (relative to petition non-signers), by 3.8% of average earnings. This is evidence on the "price" of political opposition for everyday people in Chavez's Venezuela. Pro-government individuals also have falling earnings relative to non-signers, but estimated impacts are close to zero.
In a related panel data analysis at the firm level (controlling for firm and time fixed effects and sector-specific trends), we find striking changes in manufacturing firm performance that are closely linked to firm owners' politics: pro-opposition firms (i.e., firms whose owners signed the petitions calling for Chavez to be ousted from power) have shrinking numbers of employees, less access to foreign exchange (which has been controlled by the government since 2003), and pay significantly higher taxes than other firms post-2003. Local media reports indicate that selective tax audits of opposition firms is a leading explanation for the tax result.
Finally, we explore aggregate impacts of political polarization under Chavez for the Venezuelan macroeconomy. We quantify the degree of aggregate resource misallocation across firms using the method in Hsieh and Klenow (2007) , where increasing dispersion in marginal products (of capital and labor) across firms is used as an indicator of misallocation. If factors of production were efficiently allocated, these marginal products would be equalized across firms.
Instead, we find growing dispersion in firm marginal products during and after the recall battle, with pro-opposition firms showing especially large increases in their marginal products of capital and labor. These high marginal products indicate that large productive opportunities are going unexploited, likely due to the growing constraints the government is placing on themmost notably the limited foreign exchange and the higher tax rates pro-opposition firms face. In our sample, which covers over 25% of manufacturing value-added in Venezuela, we estimate that these increased distortions across pro-opposition, pro-government, and politically neutral firms are associated with a drop of 5% in overall firm productivity. Of course, we only have data on a subset of firms and only in manufacturing. But if similar effects hold for the rest of the economy, this finding suggests growing political polarization could have important impacts on aggregate living standards in Venezuela. 1% between 1978 1% between and 1998 1% between (Rodríguez, 2004 . Studies of Venezuelan political economy include Karl (1998) , Rodríguez and Sachs (1999 ), Hausmann (2002 ), and Hausmann and Rodríguez (2007 . Also, see Penfold (2003) and Corrales (2007) on the emergence of Hugo Chavez. 6 The ability to petition for recall elections, if backed by the signatures of a pre-specified fraction of registered voters, was a novel feature of the 1999 Constitution. For revoking specific laws or on "matters of national interest" the threshold was 10% of voters; for a constitutional amendment, 15%; and to recall an elected official, 20%.
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Electoral Council (Consejo Nacional Electoral), but this decision was overturned by the Supreme Court, with the argument that the signatures had been collected fraudulently.
Undaunted, opposition groups submitted two more petitions in August 2003, one to shorten the the Presidential term from six to four years and another petition for a recall election.
Both petitions were rejected by the Electoral Council, again with the argument that many of the signatures had been forged. The Electoral Council also established new rules that were to govern the petition signing process. Specifically, voters could only sign a petition in one of the 2,700
pre-specified locations where the identity of the signatures could be verified by Electoral Council officials. In addition, this had to be done between November 28 and December 1, 2003.
During this four day period, nearly 3.5 million voters signed a petition supporting an election to recall Chávez. In response, the government also circulated petitions to recall 38 opposition legislators, and almost 2.7 million voters signed these petitions.
Again, the government claimed that the opposition signatures were fraudulent. The
Electoral Council thus began a detailed examination of each signature's authenticity, and ruled that it could not verify the authenticity of almost 1.2 million signatures. 7 The Electoral Council then set up a process by which these 1.2 million voters had could either sign the recall petition again or could withdraw their signature. This took place from May 28 to 31, 2004, and more than 50% of the voters whose signatures had been challenged showed up to "ratify" their signature, and thus the opposition petition met the recall vote threshold. 
Matching with Maisanta
We match Maisanta to the household dataset by exploiting the fact that most individuals in both datasets are uniquely identified by their gender, date of birth, and parroquia of residence. Because our matching strategy relies on the likelihood that there will be few people with the same birth date and gender within a given parroquia, and because this probability varies depending on the population of the parroquia, the fraction of successful matches to the HHS 11 The accuracy of the gender identification procedure was validated on a random sample of 200 individuals in the HHS data who had gender information, with 99.2% correct.
varies by parroquia size. We therefore weigh each observation in the final matched sample by the reciprocal of the match success rate (calculated as the ratio of the matched population to the total over 18 population in each parroquia), which places greater weight on parroquias with a lower match success rate in an attempt to retain sample representativeness.
Appendix have a higher proportion of unique matches. The age difference helps explain the slightly higher earnings, employment rates and years of schooling in the matched sample, although none of these differences is economically large. People in the matched sample are also slightly more likely to be female, to be employed in the formal sector (public and private), to live in Caracas and to live in households with fewer members.
Industrial Survey Data
We next combined Maisanta information with firm-level outcomes from the National Institute of Statistics' Industrial Survey, which has been carried out annually since 1974. separate Industrial Directory identifies all the firms surveyed in a given survey round. These directories contain information on parroquia, 4-digit industrial sector code, and firm size, as well as firm name, address, and legal registry identification number, allowing us to uniquely identify 927 of 1126 plants. These firms account for 71.4% of total private sector manufacturing output.
To obtain information on the political leanings of firm board members, we located and manually copied the firm registry documents for firms, which are public information in Venezuela. 13 The registry documents contain the names and cédula numbers of all members of the board of directors. Matching this data back to Maisanta and to the Industrial Survey allows us to calculate the percentages of board members who signed petitions against Chávez and who signed against opposition deputies. Since few of the sample firms are publicly listed, the board members largely correspond to firm shareholders.
The 350 plants that we were able to obtain registry information for account for 24.5% of the output of the private manufacturing sector. 14 These 350 plants do not form a representative sample of all firms in the survey, since our matching exercise tends to select large firms (automatically included in the survey every year) as well as firms in the key industrial centers of Caracas, Valencia, Maracay, and Zulia, where we concentrated our time-consuming firm registry data collection effort. We re-weight observations in an attempt to make the sample more representative: in the analysis below, observations are weighted by the inverse of the proportion of firms in each sector that made it into our sample of 350 firms. In the firm productivity analysis (section 5.2), we also re-weight by sectoral value-added shares. 
Political Polarization and the Labor Market
Political preferences could enter into the employment decisions of both workers and employers, in the former case if they choose to leave a job where their political views are out of step with their employer, and in the latter case if employers fire (or refuse to hire) qualified workers with different political views. In practice, these two scenarios may sometimes be hard to disentangle, for example, in the case of someone who fears she might have been fired had she not voluntarily resigned, and we do not attempt to do so in this paper.
Regardless of the exact cause, worker turnover is costly for at least two reasons. The first is the direct cost to workers of searching for a new job, perhaps enduring an unemployment spell, and adjusting to a new work environment. The second cost of increased turnover is the loss of firm-specific human capital when an experienced worker leaves. This adversely affects firm productivity as well as the worker's wage, if they are unable to transfer these skills elsewhere.
We first compare the pre-Maisanta labor market characteristics for three groups of individuals, those who signed against Chávez (pro-opposition), those who signed against the opposition (pro-government), and those who did not sign any petitions. Opposition supporters make up 20% of the household survey sample, government supporters 8%, and the remaining 72% did not sign either petition. Pro-opposition and pro-government individuals both earn higher incomes on average than non-signers pre-Maisanta, are somewhat more likely to be employed, and are several years older on average (Table 1 , Panel A). Yet there are some noticeable differences between pro-opposition and pro-government individuals. Opposition supporters are considerably more likely to be female, are less likely to live in Caracas, and have attained more years of schooling on average than government supporters. Government supporters have slightly higher earnings at baseline, which goes against the popular perception as Chavistas as overwhelmingly poor or working class. However, some of this difference could be due to the concentration of Chavistas in Caracas.
A striking pattern emerges when we examine the latest round of household survey data:
by that point, the non-signers have caught up with and even surpassed both Opposition and ProChávez supporters in terms of labor income (Table 1 , Panel B). One possible explanation is that there was retribution in the labor market against politically active people of both sides relative to non-political individuals. However, these differences could instead be driven by demographic or regional differences in the three groups of individuals, and perhaps differential time trends for these groups. The possibility of bias caused by time-varying omitted variables correlated with individuals' political affiliation is the main econometric concern.
To address these concerns and more rigorously establish the impact of political polarization on labor market outcomes in Venezuela, we turn to regression analysis that controls for a range of individual characteristics and time trends. We focus on a difference-in-differences econometric specification of the following form:
Y is the labor market outcome of interest. α is an individual fixed effect (recall that households are retained in the rotation survey panel for six semesters), and η is a semester fixed effect. The Finally, ε is the standard white noise disturbance term, and is allowed to be correlated across observations for the same individual.
Annual earnings drop for both opposition and government supporters after 2003, with somewhat larger impacts on government supporters in a specification without individual fixed effects ( Table 2 , regression 1). In our preferred specification with individual fixed effects, semester fixed effects and time trends interacted with a range of individual characteristics, both terms remain negative but the impact on opposition supporters becomes negative and highly statistically significant (-50, standard error 23) while the effect for government supporters is smaller and no longer significant at traditional confidence levels (regression 2). This is evidence The drop in overall annual earnings is driven by both moderate earnings declines for those with jobs (Table 3, (regression 3), although neither effect separately is statistically significant. The time patterns for employment are presented in Figure 2 , and they are similar to those for total labor earnings.
There are much larger shifts in employment sectors. There is a sharp decrease in the probability that government supporters are employed in the formal private sector (-0.0233, standard error 0.0083, Table 3 regression 4), and a significant decrease in public sector employment for opposition supporters (-0.0070, standard error 0.0031, regression 5). This is strong evidence for extensive churning in the labor market, either due to deliberate employer purges of people with differing political views, as suggested by some of the anecdotal evidence, or individuals choosing to sort into work environments where their views are closer to the mainstream. In either case, growing political polarization in the recall period is accompanied by marked shifts in labor market outcomes. The reduction in public sector employment for proopposition individuals is 5.7% of pre-Maisanta public sector employment, and the analogous reduction in private sector employment for government supporters is 6.1%.
Finally, there are similar increases in informal private sector employment for both proopposition and pro-government individuals, although effects are only statistically significant for opposition supporters (Table 3 , regression 6).
There is little evidence of heterogeneous treatment effects on total labor earnings (Table   4) : differences are not statistically significant by gender or schooling attainment, although there is some suggestive evidence that earnings drops are large for pro-opposition males than progovernment males (regression 2). There is, however, stronger evidence that the degree of churning across the private and public sectors is greater among men than women: male progovernment supporters appear more likely than females to leave formal private sector employment (Table 5 , Panel A, regressions 1-2), and male opposition supporters are driving nearly the entire shift out of public sector employment (Panel B, regressions 1-2). Venezuelan labor legislation may contribute to this differential effect: the labor code makes it harder to fire women. 16 There is also evidence that pro-opposition individuals with above median levels of schooling are more likely to shift out of the public sector after 2003 (regressions 3-4), although the same result does not hold for shifts out of the private sector for government supporters.
Political Polarization and Firms
We again divide our sample in three groups: the first category is those firms in which some board members signed against Chávez (and no board members signed against the opposition), a second set where the opposite occurred, and a third category covers a group of "neutral" firms where there were either both pro-and anti-Chávez signers or all board members abstained from signing either way (Table 6 ). In the analysis below, we use a continuous measure of political support, but this breakdown into three groups is a useful starting point for descriptive statistics.
The Venezuelan private sector is dominated by the political opposition: 73.4% of firms are proopposition, while only 1.5% are unambiguously pro-government. Recall that the respective proportions among household survey respondents were 20% pro-opposition and 8% progovernment. The pro-government firms are larger than other firms on average, regardless of whether we measure size in employees, sales, or profits. (Table 6 , Panel B), firm employment changes little, but output declines rapidly in pro-government firms, in contrast to the neutral and pro-opposition firms. This results in collapsing labor productivity in pro-government firms (by 37%) while productivity in pro-opposition firms increases by 3% and in neutral firms by 14%.
If the 1995-2003 period is compared with 2004
To understand the robustness of this initial pattern, we pursue a similar empirical approach as above, a difference-in-differences specification that estimates whether firms whose owners expressed a particular political position saw changing economic fortunes:
Z it is the firm outcome of interest (e.g., employment), i α is a firm-specific fixed effect, t η is a time-specific effect, t s λ is an industrial sector-specific trend, 1(.) is the indicator function, and
Pro-opposition it and Pro-government it respectively denote the fraction of board members who signed against Chávez or against opposition deputies.
Firm employment grew much more rapidly in pro-government firms than in politically neutral firms after 2003 (by 54 log points, Table 7 regression 1). The difference between the employment growth of pro-government and pro-opposition firms is highly significant: equality of the two coefficient estimates rejected at p=0.003. The interpretation is that shifting from being a politically neutral firm to one where all board members signed against the opposition would grow by 54 log points, or 42%, during this period. Output and profits, in turn, expanded more in pro-government firms, although by less than the employment increase (regressions 2 and 3). Thus pro-government firms have falling labor productivity on average relative to neutral and pro-opposition firms (regression 4), although the difference between pro-government and proopposition firms here is not significant at traditional confidence levels (p=0.13).
The data is thus broadly consistent with the hypothesis that favorable treatment by the government leads pro-government firms to become more inefficient. There is anecdotal evidence in Venezuela of government action against political opponents, ranging from restricting the allocation of foreign exchange to outright expropriation. The evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that tax enforcement was being systematically targeted used against pro-opposition firms. According to our results, a firm in which all board members signed against the opposition could expect to pay 0.5% in additional taxes as a fraction of total revenue relative to neutral and pro-government firms (Table 7) . This is a very large effect since the average tax rate across all firms is a bit over 1%, so this implies an increase of almost 40% in taxes paid by pro-opposition firms. A Tobit specification (regression 6) with total taxes as the dependent variable yields similar results. 17 Pro-government firms also appear to pay lower taxes on average than politically neutral firms, although that difference is not statistically significant.
Venezuela imposed strict exchange controls in early 2003, requiring approval for all purchases requiring foreign exchange from the Commission for Foreign Exchange 17 The length of our panel (T=8.11) implies that the incidental parameters problem should not be an important drawback to using fixed effects with the Tobit specification. Heckman and MaCurdy(1980) have argued that with T=8 the inconsistency is minor. Greene (2004) Firms whose entire board signed the petition against Chávez would be expected to see a decline of 79 log points in their foreign exchange allocation, relative to a firm where no board member signed the petition (standard error 0.37, statistically significant at 95% confidence, Table 7 , regression 7), conditional on firm sector and other firm characteristics. This is equivalent to a 55% decline. There is a positive effect of signing the petition against the opposition on foreign exchange access (coefficient estimate 0.50, standard error 0.29, significant at 90% confidence), and the difference in coefficient estimates across pro-opposition and progovernment firms is highly statistically significant (p<0.01). This analysis is conducted among firms that received some foreign exchange, yet pro-opposition are also significantly less likely to receive any foreign exchange at all, by approximately 19 percentage points (regression 8).
Marginal Products of Capital and Labor
The evidence presented above of discrimination against opposition firms and favoritism towards pro-government firms in terms of taxation and foreign exchange suggests that political polarization may have worsened the allocation of resources across firms in Venezuela. To explore this issue, we use a method developed by Hsieh and Klenow (2007) to measure differences in the marginal product of resources between pro-opposition and pro-government firms. We then quantify the effect of the gaps in marginal products across these firms on aggregate total factor productivity (TFP).
The core of Hsieh and Klenow's approach is a model of heterogenous firms with firm specific distortions. Specifically, suppose that aggregate industry output is a CES aggregate of M differentiated products:
Assume that each differentiated product is made by a different firm with the following production function:
We will assume that i A differs across firms. In addition, firms also face firm specific distortions.
We denote distortions that decrease the marginal products of capital and labor as Y τ and distortions that raise the marginal cost of capital relative to that of labor as K τ . Empirically, the first distortion corresponds to differential taxation (or subsidies) across firms, while the second to differential costs of capital, where one important factor determining capital input costs in Venezuela is access to foreign exchange. Profits are:
(1 )
Profit maximization yields the following for the marginal revenue products of labor and capital:
. 1
As can be seen, the marginal product of labor and capital will be equalized across firms if all firms face exactly the same distortions. In turn, aggregate industry TFP is given by: 
The effect of the distortions on aggregate TFP can thus be summarized by two statistics: the variance of the marginal products and the covariance of the marginal products with A, underlying firm productivity.
Within this framework, we can measure the extent by which preferential treatment for pro-government firms increased their marginal products, and the discrimination against proopposition firms resulted in lower marginal products. From (6) and (7), the average marginal product of a firm is:
Using Venezuelan Industrial Survey data, we measure si si P Y by plant value-added (for firm i in sector s), si K by the book-value of the plant's capital stock, si L by the plant's wage-bill, and s α by the aggregate wage-bill share in industry value-added for sector s (adjusted for the profit share). We then measure the difference in marginal products across pro-opposition and progovernment firms relative to the average marginal product in each sector. Specifically, we run:
where it γ denotes a matrix of indicator variables for year, sector-year (thus controlling for sector-wide time trends), and pro-opposition or pro-government status of the firm owners. Here, How does the growing gap in marginal products between Chavez and opposition firms affect aggregate output? From (9), the answer to this question depends on how the gap in marginal products documented in Table 8 affects the dispersion of marginal products and the covariation of marginal product with underlying firm TFP (A). We can not answer this question for the whole economy because we only have information on the political affiliation of a subset of the firms in the Venezuelan manufacturing census. However, under two strong assumptions:
1) the distribution of pro-opposition and pro-government firms in our sample is the same as that in the entire distribution of firms and; 2) the gaps in marginal products between pro-opposition and pro-government firms in our sample is the same as that in the rest of the economy, we can calculate the contribution of these growing gaps in marginal products to aggregate TFP.
Taking 1999 as a benchmark, the growing TFP gap between the three types of firms increased the variance of marginal products by 0.05 log points. Therefore, if we assume a markup of 50 percent (σ = 3 in equation 3), the political polarization documented in this paper may have been responsible for a decline in aggregate Venezuelan TFP of roughly 5 percent.
Discussion
This paper has provided evidence that individuals in a politically polarized society sometimes pay a substantial cost for expressing pro-opposition political beliefs. Our estimates indicate that signers of the 2003-2004 recall petitions against Hugo Chávez in Venezuela suffered an average decline of 3.8% in earnings as a consequence of making their political preferences public. We also find that signers of the recall referendum petition were significantly less likely to be employed in the public sector and more likely to be employed in the informal sector after the publication of the database.
The costs paid by pro-opposition individuals were not limited to the labor market. The firms whose board members signed against the government also appear to have lost out: on average, firms with pro-opposition individuals on their board were taxed more heavily, had less access to foreign exchange, and experienced declines in size relative to other firms. Progovernment firms also appear to have become less productive during this period, potentially as a consequence of favorable government treatment and largesse.
Although our results suggest that signing the petition against the government was unambiguously worse than not signing it, it is less clear that signing the pro-Chávez petition was an optimal strategy. There is no evidence that pro-Chávez signers had superior labor market outcomes than non-signers: if anything, the data indicates that they on average received somewhat lower earnings (though the difference with non-signers is not significantly different from zero). However, firm board members who signed the pro-Chávez petitions do appear to have generated positive results for their stockholders, a result consistent with accounts of the emergence of a new pro-government business class in Venezuela.
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This paper also provides direct evidence on a channel through which political conflict affects the efficiency of resource allocation. Even though many empirical studies have found a correlation between political conflict and growth at the national level, there exists little evidence on the mechanisms through which this effect may operate. We show that increased political polarization in Venezuela was associated with growing dispersion in firm marginal products across pro-government and pro-opposition firms, likely due to inefficient factor allocation across firms. Assuming that the dispersion in our sample is representative of the economy as a whole, this increased politicization of factor allocation contributed to a decline of 5% in aggregate Venezuelan total factor productivity during 1999-2004.
The use of economic incentives to punish opponents in environments of political polarization has been extensively documented in developing and developed country settings by political scientists and historians. In the 1950s, hundreds of actors, screenwriters, and others in Hollywood were effectively banned from employment after being suspected of membership in the U.S. Communist Party (Ceplair and Englund, 2003) . In Cuba, the state uses information on the activities of possible dissidents collected by a broad network of local committees to mete out 19 See, for example, The Economist (2007) or Romero (2006) . punishments including banishment from certain parts of the country, public disgrace, and job loss (Aguirre, 2002) . During the Chinese Cultural Revolution, suspected reactionaries and descendants of non-working class backgrounds were sent to live and work in the countryside, effectively barring them from access to a university education (Bernstein, 1977) The implications of these incentives for resource allocation and collective choice were discussed by Kuran (1993) in his classic study of preference falsification. Kuran argued that whenever individuals could express their political beliefs they would also face incentives to misrepresent their true preferences. In his theoretical analysis, there are equilibria where large fractions of the population lie about their political preferences in order to resemble other individuals. Despite the considerable interest sparked by this research (Frank, 1996, Arce and Sandler, 2003) , empirical developments have been hampered by the lack of availability of data on individuals' political statements. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first paper to provide an econometric estimate of the economic consequences of publicly expressing a dissident political preference.
In December (first semester). The household survey data was matched to Maisanta using individual gender, birth date, and parish (parroquia) of residence, and only unique political matched retained (as described in the text). The "Employed" variable includes only those coded as "active" in the labor market. Notes: Robust Huber-White standard errors, clustered by firm. Statistically significantly different than zero at 99% (***), 95% (**), 90% (*) confidence. The Notes: The data is for years 1997 (first semester) -2002 (second semester) from the household labor market survey. The household survey data was matched to Maisanta using individual gender, birth date, and parish (parroquia) of residence, and only unique matched retained. Statistically significantly different than zero at 99% (***), 95% (**), 90% (*) confidence.
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Appendix Notes: Robust Huber-White standard errors, clustered by individual. Statistically significantly different than zero at 99% (***), 95% (**), 90% (*) confidence. Controls included in all regressions for female-year, year of birth-year, Lives in Caracas-year, years of schooling-year time trends.
